Introduction
In the course of our own research on theoretical concepts for ecology, inspired by computing and information science, we have discovered the recent 1 article "Quantifying sustainability: Resilience, efficiency and the return of information theory" (Ulanowicz et al., 2009) . It has been a sincere pleasure to discover that renowned ecologists keep advocating the use of information theory for the description and assessment of ecosystems. It has been a severe disappointment, however, that information theory is far from being portrayed in the best possible light in the article in question-the formulation and use of basic IT concepts are unnecessarily obscure, deliberately incompatible with standard terminology, and in places just mathematically wrong.
We shall endeavor to lift some of the confusion by correcting errors, dissecting ambiguities and using standard terminology wherever possible. We believe that clear and rigorous presentations are necessary in order to enable information theoreticians and ecologists to engage in a fruitful dialogue. Only very basic concepts of IT are required to follow our arguments. The interested reader is referred to the textbook of MacKay, 2003 , an excellent and encyclopaedic treatise that is freely accessible online.
This critique should not be understood as extending to the content of the criticized article; it adresses its formal presentation only. To the contrary, our disappointment arises mainly from fear that the article might influence readers rather against than in favour of application of IT in ecology, because of the vague air of inconsistency owing to the many terminological and mathematical issues we are about to discuss.
Terms

Surprisal and Shannon Information Content
What Ulanowicz et al. call "Boltzmann's famous definition of surprisal", s = −k log p, is nowadays known in IT as the Shannon information content of an event. While Boltzmann preceded Shannon by some 80 years, it was the latter who generalized the idea, brilliant as it may have been, into a full-fledged theory.
The scalar constant k is not explicit in the modern definition; rather, it is implicit in the dimensionless unit implied by the choice of base of the logarithm; cf. section 3.5 below. The particular constant k B that nowadays bears Boltzmann's name is for the particular case of thermodynamic entropy, and carries the dimension of a heat capacity. Shannon argues that, in IT, no single appropriate value exists, and the constant "merely amounts to a choice of a unit of measure" (Shannon, 1948) , in the sense that it is the only degree of freedom in an axiomatic specification of the entropy function, see below.
It is ironic that Ulanowicz et al. elaborate on the sign of the expression, "Because the probability, p, is normalized to a fraction between zero and one, most offhandedly conclude that the negative sign is a mathematical convenience to make s work out positive 
Aggregate Indeterminacy and Entropy
What Ulanowicz et al. call the "aggregate systems indeterminacy", defined in their equation (3) up to a missing equality sign (a simple typographic error that may subtly confuse the reader nevertheless), is nowadays usually called the Shannon entropy of a random variable whose possible outcomes are specified by the events i and respective probabilities p i .
Because all of the following definitions involve more than one random variable, it greatly adds to clarity to mention them explicitly:
We shall use only the symbols Y and Z for random variables, because X is reserved in the notation of Ulanowicz et al., 2009. 
Average Mutual Constraint and Mutual Information
What Ulanowicz et al. call the "average mutual constraint" (without saying precisely between what, see sections 3.1 and 3.3), defined in their equation (5), is usually called the mutual information or transinformation between two random variables.
Note that the explanations leading to equation (5) are problematic in various ways, see sections 3.1 to 3.3.
Conditional Entropy
What Ulanowicz et al. call the "conditional entropy" Ψ is not what is usually called a conditional entropy. A typical definition of conditional entropy, or quivocation, of Y given Z would look like:
It plays an important role in the decomposition of uncertainties in IT, such as in the so-called chain rule:
The definition of Ulanowicz et al.'s equation (7) can be retrieved by adding the conditional entropies of Y given Z and vice versa:
This sum is sometimes called the variation of information between Y and Z. It is easy to see that it satisfies the axioms of a metric and may hence serve as an information-theoretic measure of distance between random variables.
Ambiguities and Errors
Events and Random Variables
In equation (3), Ulanowicz et al. give the (slightly broken) definition of the Shannon entropy of a single random variable. Immediately afterwards, they move on to the more complex topic of a pair of random variables, but without explicitly saying so. The transition is implied in the statement: "Accordingly, we will define p ij as the joint probability that events i and j co-occur."
The failure to explicitly identify the two random variables, only distinguished by the fact that their outcomes are indexed with variables i and j, respectively, causes confusion even with the authors themselves: They apparently fail to realize that what they call the conditional entropy is in fact the sum of two conditional entropies, namely of each random variable conditional on the other. Consequently, the interesting question whether the two should be lumped together or examined separately is not addressed: For instance, calculation of conditional entropies of Y (origin of flow) given Z (destination of flow) and vice versa for the networks depicted in Ulanowicz et al.'s Figs. 1 and 3 are strongly asymmetric, with ratios of 1 : 6 and 1 : 8.6, respectively. We do not have an ecological rationale why this should be meaningful, but we feel that a distinction that arises naturally from standard terminology should not be obscured deliberately, unless it has been proven irrelevant.
The same source of imprecision might also have contributed to the problem discussed in the next subsection.
Joint Indeterminacy and Independency
In their explanation of "average mutual constraint" (mutual information), between their two equations both numbered (4), Ulanowicz et al. state: "Here the assumption is made that the indeterminacy s ij [= −k log(p ij )] is maximal when i and j are totally independent. We call that maximum s * ij ." The assumption does not hold, and there is no such maximum: For independent events, we have p ij = p i. p .j , but joint probabilities can of course be smaller than that value. In particular, s ij = +∞ for mutually exclusive events.
Stating that s ij is bounded above by s * ij is equivalent to stating that p ij is bounded below by p i. p .j . We can only conjecture that this (false) assumption is made in order to ensure that mutual information is nonnegative. Fortunately, the assumption is not needed: Individual terms log(p ij /p i. p .j ) in equation (5) may well be negative, but their weighted sum, the mutual information, is nonnegative by Gibbs' inequality; see also section 3.4.
Symmetry of Mutual Information
Ulanowicz et al. claim that their second equation (4) is symmetric, written as x i|j = · · · = x j|i . Note that this is not symmetry in the usual algebraic sense, namely that the indices i and j may simply be exchanged. If one does so naïvely, the denominator of the argument to the logarithm becomes p j. p .i which is very different from p i. p .j . On the other hand, if one remembers that i and j are events concerning two different random variables Y and Z, respectively, then the symmetry becomes obvious, as both 
The role of the Logarithm
Much has been said about the role of the logarithm in the formulae of IT. Ulanowicz et al. promise in their footnote 1:
"Here the reader might ask why the lack of i is not represented more directly by (1 − p i )?
The advantage and necessity of using the logarithm will become apparent presently."
But only a very brief rationale can be found in the following discussion, qualifying hardly as advantageous, and certainly not as necessary: In the statement leading to their equation (6) it is claimed (correctly) that the convexity of the logarithm ensures that joint entropy decomposes into mutual information and conditional entropies, all non-negative. But that would be true for any other convex function. Shannon, 1948 has the definitive answer to the riddle: Any function satisfying a small number of properties characteristic of a measure of uncertainty (namely continuity, monotonicity in the number of outcomes of uniform distributions, and additive compositionality of choice) is necessarily equivalent to Shannon entropy, up to a conversion of units.
Instead of actually working with logarithms, Ulanowicz et al. promptly revert to non-logarithmic scales in their section 5, in the introduction to the concept of "window of vitality". There they cite previous work (Zorach and Ulanowicz, 2003) , where the measures are developed in entirely non-logarithmic form. For additional serious problems with the concerned paragraphs, see section 3.6 below.
Logarithmic Units
In the argument leading towards their definitions of "ascendency" and "reserve", after equation (10), Ulanowicz et al. state: "The dimensions in the definitions (10) remain problematic, however. All of the ratios that occur there are dimensionless (as required of probabilities), so that the only dimensions that the variables H, X and Ψ carry are those of the base of the logarithm used in their calculation. For example, if the base of the logarithm is 2, the variables are all measured in bits."
In this statement, the concepts of unit and dimension are confused. A unit conveys two independent aspects of meaning: dimension and magnitude. For example, the SI unit 1 m has the dimension length and a magnitude in relation to other units of length that makes it equivalent to, say, 39.37 in. The units of information, just like other logarithmic quantities, are dimensionless units, but they do have a magnitude. For example, 1 bit is equivalent to 1/8 byte, about 1.44 nat or 3.01 dB. If we take the last sentence of the above quotation as implying that the base of the logarithm is not fixed once and for all, then the magnitude of the unit of IT measures carries essential meaning.
In the immediately following section 4, "A two-tendency world", Ulanowicz et al. give concrete numbers for material flows in an ecosystem and purport to multiply IT measures with total flow: "T .. for this system is 102.6 mg C m −2 y −1 ; the ascendency, A, works out to 53.9 mg C bits m −2 y −1 and the reserve, Φ, is 121.3 mg C bits m −2 y −1 ."
Have you noticed the difference in units between the first and the following figures? That they are given in one sentence creates the dangerously false impression that the absolute values can be compared as "apples with apples" (Ulanowicz et al., 2009 , section 7, "One-Eyed Ecology"). The practice is even worse than ambiguous: the use of several decimal places and fully explicit dimensional units suggest an absoluteness that is not warranted. The above figure for A could be given as either
• 53.9 mg C bit m −2 y −1 , in the logarithmic units of base 2 chosen by the authors, or
• 37.7 mg C nat m −2 y −1 , in the logarithmic units of base e used by Boltzmann, or
• 162.3 mg C dB m −2 y −1 , in the logarithmic units of base 10 1/10 preferred by electric engineers, or
• 6.74 mg C byte m −2 y −1 , in the logarithmic units of base 2 8 (such that 1 byte = 8 bit) preferred by many computer scientists, or
• 9.88 pg C CDROM m −2 y −1 , in the logarithmic units corresponding to the information content of a standard (Red Book) Mode-1 CD-ROM of 666 000 × 1024 byte, or
• 64.7 g C cent m −2 y −1 , in the logarithmic units of base 2 1/1200 preferred by musicians, or in whatever logarithmic units another author might fancy.
Having ruled out the possibility to compare flows with flow-information products directly, and having conceded that flow-information products only make sense when compared to each other in appropriately adjusted units, one wonders why the IT measures have been multiplied with flows in the first place; all of the arguments of their section 4 would have worked perfectly, and with less room for confusion, with X and Ψ in place of A and Φ. See also the next subsection.
Exponential Units in the Window of Vitality
Even the reader who has worked through the bookkeeping of dimensional and dimensionless units in the section we have just discussed, must be baffled by the following statement Ulanowicz et al., 2009 , section 5, "The survival of the most robust": " Zorach and Ulanowicz (2003) [. . . ] plotted the networks, not on the axes A vs. Φ, but rather on the transformed axes c = 2 Φ/2 and n = 2 A .
Certainly this cannot be correct, because here dimensional quantities appear in the exponents. Crossreading of the cited source (Zorach and Ulanowicz, 2003 ) reveals a definition of the symbol Φ equivalent to the definition of the symbol Ψ by Ulanowicz et al., 2009 . Although more difficult to verify, we conjecture that A should be read as X accordingly. That is, after attaching physical dimensions to information measures by multiplying them with flows, the authors silently revert to the dimensionless quantities, in order to make exponential scaling meaningful.
What makes the comparison of information measures for different systems possible is exactly what is criticized scornfully in their section 3: "Unfortunately, bits do not convey any sense of the physical magnitude of the systems to which they pertain. For example, a network of flows among the populations of microbes in a Petri Dish could conceivably yield an H of the same order of magnitude as a network of trophic exchanges among the mammalian species on the Serengeti Plain."
This feature of IT, namely that it quantifies information content of observed choice (traditionally of messages in communication) as intensive properties, regardless of the extent of systems that produce them, is commonly regarded as one of its essential abstractions. Nor is this an uncommon practice in science; certainly no one would object to the temperature of a Petri Dish being compared to the temperature of the Serengeti Plain. Temperature as an example has not been chosen randomly; indeed Boltzmann's work on uncertainty has had its main application in thermodynamics.
Conclusion
Interdisciplinary research is partially motivated by the hope that innovative research can be sparked by exposing experts of one field to the concepts of another. The article criticized here, though clearly intended for the very purpose, is an illustrative example how not to do it. An overview article in a journal is not the place to provide a sound and complete introduction to a theory, but it can and should leave a non-expert reader both motivated and prepared to read up on the details in the literature of the field.
We have identified two key issues that merit words of warning and recommendations to prospective interdisciplinary researchers:
1. Ideosyncratic terminology. Renaming key concepts of theories in the process of translating them to a different field leaves the reader unfit to look up the technical details in the relevant literature. Theoreticians have a cause for celebration whenever they discover that concepts in disparate fields are actually the same; actively propagating obfuscated terminology hinders theoretical progress and may well cause the reinvention of several wheels.
Internal inconsistency.
A reader who is not an expert on the subject may not fully grasp, or explicitly doubt, the results of a mathematical discussion at first sight; scepticism is generally a laudable trait for a scientist. However, there are numerous heuristics to judge whether the arguments in question can possibly be valid: Mathematical digressions should be both true and relevant, dimensions and units should match for all figures to be compared, all mathematical objects involved in a definition should be named, etcetera. All maths, especially when given to demonstrate the usefulness of a theory, should be prepared carefully enough to pass the test of heuristic reading by a reasonably educated non-expert. On the other side, editors should feel encouraged to seek reviews of interdisciplinary articles from experts in the respective other field. Thus, issues as the ones we have pointed out above, and possibly less obvious ones also, could be remedied before publication.
A description of an unfamiliar theory in terms that cannot be traced to their usage in the field, and in formulae that obviously cannot be quite right, makes a tough reading. Who can blame the readers for concluding that the subject is not worth their attention? However, that conclusion could be severely premature.
In the present case, we see no reason to doubt the validity or the utility of Ulanowicz et al.'s philosophical observations and empirical findings. The proposal to investigate the potential (as opposed to actual as in philosophy, not as opposed to kinetic as in physics) is certainly sound. We conjecture that similar investigations would be worthwhile for other subdisciplines of what is nowadays subsumed under computing and information science, for instance in modal, fuzzy and other nonclassical logics, or nondeterministic automata theory. Evidence of tentative import into ecology can be found in the logical study of uncertainty (Regan, Colyvan, and Burgman, 2002) , and in the use of Petri nets (not to be confused with Petri dishes) for ecological modelling by Sharov, 1991, respectively . The latter is a fine case in point of our critique, as an interdisciplinary application that is also quite up to the internal standards of the Petri net community. We are looking forward to an ecological presentation of information measures of comparable quality.
